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No antitrust violation absent a showing of harm
from an "economically rational"predatory pricing
conspiracy
by Mary Grossman
To recover under the antitrust
laws for harm caused by a predatory
pricing conspiracy, a plaintiff must
be able to demonstrate that the
alleged conspiracy was economically rational. In Matsushita
ElectricalIndustrialCo., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986), two American television
manufacturers proved unable to
convince the United States Supreme
Court that twenty-one Japanese
manufacturers who sold televisions
for lower prices in the United States
than in Japan had engaged in a
predatory pricing conspiracy in
violation of the antitrust laws
because the alleged conspiracy was
economically irrational.
In the five to four decision, the
Supreme Court reversed the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals and upheld
the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Japanese
television manufacturers. The
American manufacturers, Zenith
Radio Corporation ("Zenith") and
National Union Electric Corporation
("NUB"), charged the Japanese
manufacturers with conspiring to fix
television prices at artificially low
levels in the United States and
artificially high levels in Japan in an
attempt to drive American manufacturers from the market. The American manufacturers claimed that the
Japanese manufacturers' pricing
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policies violated the Sherman Act,
the Robinson-Patman Act, the
Wilson Tariff Act and the Antidumping Act of 1916. However, Zenith
and NUE were unable to convince
the Supreme Court that a genuine
issue of material fact existed
regarding the nature of the Japanese
manufacturers' pricing policies.
The Japanese manufacturers
moved for summary judgment after
lengthy discovery. In considering the
motion, the district court reviewed
lists of evidence that both sides
intended to produce at trial. The
district court determined that most
of the American manufacturers'
evidence was inadmissible. In
addition, the district court held that
the remaining admissible evidence
did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the conspiracy allegations and granted the
Japanese manufacturers' motion for
summary judgment. The American
manufacturers appealed to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.

Possibility of conspiracy
based on evidence noted
by court of appeals
The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court.
In reaching its decision, the court of
appeals held that much of the
excluded evidence was admissible

and should have been considered
with regard to the motion for
summary judgment. The court of
appeals delineated six possible
conclusions a reasonable fact finder
could reach based upon the excluded
evidence. All six conclusions
supported the American manufacturers' conspiracy theory. First, the
Japanese manufacturers could create
both high prices and high profits in
Japan which the American manufacturers could not undercut because of
significant trade barriers erected by
the Japanese government. Second,
the Japanese manufacturers had
higher fixed costs than Zenith and
NUE, thereby requiring the Japanese
manufacturers to operate at nearly
full capacity to make a profit. Third,
the Japanese manufacturers' plant
capacity exceeded the demands of
the Japanese market which, together
with the second factor, gave the
Japanese manufacturers a strong
incentive to increase their sales in
the United States. Fourth, the
Japanese manufacturers had entered
into agreements fixing the minimum
prices for the sale of televisions in
the United States. Fifth, each
Japanese manufacturer agreed to sell
through only five American distributors. Finally, the Japanese manufacturers undercut their own prices
through a variety of rebate schemes,
driving the prices charged in the
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United States even lower.
The court of appeals decided that
a reasonable fact finder could infer
from these conclusions that the
Japanese manufacturers conspired to
depress prices and drive the American manufacturers out of the market.
Since a reasonable fact finder could
infer such a conspiracy, the court of
appeals held that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether
the Japanese manufacturers had
violated the antitrust laws. Thus, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's grant of
the Japanese manufacturers' motion
for summary judgment.

Supreme Court determines
conspiracy theory
economically irrational
The Japanese manufacturers
appealed the decision, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide two issues. The Court's
principal task was to determine
whether the court of appeals
properly evaluated the district
court's decision to grant the Japanese manufacturers' motion for
summary judgment. In addition, the
Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the Japanese manufacturers
could be liable under the antitrust
laws for a conspiracy compelled, at
least in part, by a foreign government. The Supreme Court quickly
disposed of the latter issue, ruling
that insufficient evidence existed to
established a conspiracy which
injured the American manufacturers
and that even if a conspiracy existed,
"American antitrust laws do not
regulate the competitive price
conditions of other nations' economies." The Supreme Court then
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turned its attention to the summary
judgment issue.
The Court held that in order to
survive the motion for summary
judgment, the American manufacturers should have demonstrated the
existence of genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the
Japanese manufacturers illegally
conspired against the American
manufacturers and whether the
alleged conspiracy injured the
American manufacturers. The
American manufacturers also should
have demonstrated that the various
alleged pricing conspiracies were
actually predatory pricing conspiracies which harmed the American
manufacturers. The Court expressed
its skepticism that the American
manufacturers suffered an "antitrust
injury" at the hands of a predatory
pricing conspiracy. The Court
doubted the existence of such a
conspiracy because the alleged
conspiratorial activity would tend to
benefit the American manufacturers.
To overcome the motion for
summary judgment, the Court
indicated that the appellate court
should have required more persuasive evidence from the American
manufacturers supporting their claim
because their "claim is one that
simply makes no economic sense."
The Court also noted that the court
of appeals should have required
evidence which would exclude the
possibility of independent rather
than conspiratorial action by the
Japanese manufacturers.
The Supreme Court decided that
the allegations of a predatory pricing
conspiracy were most likely
unfounded because they made no
economic sense. The Court indicated
that profits from a predatory pricing

conspiracy are speculative in nature.
Since the Japanese manufacturers
had been undercutting the Americans' prices for twenty years, it
would have been irrational for the
Japanese manufacturers to incur
losses for twenty years because
recovering from such large losses
through later monopolistic profits
would have been unlikely. The Court
concluded that the Japanese manufacturers had no motive to incur
losses without a reasonable expectation of recovering those losses. It
was more likely that the Japanese
manufacturers were able to sell at
lower prices, not because they were
selling at a loss under a predatory
pricing agreement, but because their
costs were lower than American
manufacturing costs. Thus, the
Court did not agree that the low
prices charged by the Japanese
manufacturers indicated the existence of a predatory pricing conspiracy designed to drive the
American manufacturers out of the
market.
When the Supreme Court
described the alleged predatory
pricing conspiracy to drive the
American manufacturers out of the
market as economically irrational,
the Americans' challenge to the
Japanese manufacturers' motion for
summary judgment was doomed.
The Court held that the American
manufacturers had been unable to
demonstrate any other plausible
motives for the alleged predatory
pricing conspiracy. Since the
American manufacturers proved
unable to demonstrate a rational
motive for the alleged conspiracy,
no "genuine issue for trial" existed.
Where a "genuine issue for trial" is
not present, a grant of summary
-
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judgment is appropriate. The
Supreme Court, therefore, reversed
the court of appeals and concurred
with the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the
Japanese manufacturers. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court remanded to
the circuit court of appeals for
consideration of other plausible
motives for the alleged predatory
pricing conspiracy. On remand, in In
re JapaneseProductsAntitrust
Litigation,807 F.2d 44 (3d Cir.
1986), the court of appeals found no

other rational motives for the alleged
conspiracy and, thus, no genuine
issue for trial.

Dissenting opinion
In their dissent, Justices White,
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens
faulted the majority's invasion of the
fact finder's province. The American
manufacturers presented evidence of
the existence of the conspiracy and
harm caused by the conspiracy. The
dissenters contended that the Court

acted as the fact finder when it relied
on its own "economic theorizing"
over that of the American manufacturers' expert. The dissenters agreed
with the court of appeals that the
American manufacturers should
have had the opportunity to present
their evidence to a fact finder to
decide whether the Japanese
manufacturers used a predatory
pricing conspiracy to violate the
antitrust laws.

Sufficiently stated antitrust claims held arbitrable
under licensing agreement
by Alex Goldman
In PPG Industries,Inc. v. Pildngton plc, 825 F.
Supp. 1465 (D. Ariz. 1993), the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona faced two motions by
the defendant ("Pilkington"): (1) a motion to dismiss the
monopolization and attempted monopolization counts in
the plaintiff's ("PPG") complaint; and (2) a motion to
stay proceedings and compel arbitration or dismissal of
the claims filed. Relying on the standards for dismissal
and PPG's allegation that Pilkington possessed monopoly power in specific markets, the court denied the
motion to dismiss the monopolization and attempted
monopolization claims. However, persuaded by the
language of the 1962 Licensing Agreement ("Agreement") between PPG and Pilkington and the Federal
Arbitration Act, the court granted the motion to stay the
proceedings and compel arbitration of PPG's claims in
England. The court retained jurisdiction over the matter
to make sure the arbitration would be carried out in
accordance with United States antitrust law.

PPG files antitrustaction
In the late 1950s, Pilkington successfully developed
and patented a float process for the manufacture of flat
1997

glass. Pilkington licensed this technology to PPG under
the 1962 Agreement. Pilkington also entered into over
50 licensing agreements involving the operation of 150
float glass manufacturing plants around the world.
In the mid-1970s, PPG patented its own float process,
called the "LB process," and made efforts to license,
build, develop, and operate plants using the LB technology. These efforts led to a series of disputes between
PPG and Pilkington in which Pilkington claimed the LB
process was a derivative of its own technology and,
therefore, fell under the 1962 Agreement. Pursuant to
the Agreement's provisions, Pilkington initiated arbitration proceedings in London for the resolution of these
disputes.
The latest dispute arose in 1985. This dispute
stemmed from PPG's efforts to involve itself in the
construction and operation of an LB process-based flat
glass plant in China. Pilkington again submitted the
issue to arbitration, and a resolution was reached in
1992. The arbitrators decided that PPG would have
independently developed the LB process in due time
because of its efforts in China. Nevertheless, the
arbitrators awarded Pilkington a "national" royalty.
Later in 1992, PPG filed a complaint against Pilkington,
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